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The ideas of human rights and basic human needs are closely connected. Human rights – 
rights that apply for every person because they are a human – can be seen as rights to the 
fulfilment of, or ability to fulfil, basic human needs. These needs provide the grounding 
for human rights. ‘Behind human rights are freedoms and needs so fundamental that their 
denial puts human dignity itself at risk’ (Goldewijk & Fortman, 1999: 117). Basic human 
needs are whatever people require to be able to achieve a level of functioning that 
satisfies a given ethical conception of the acceptable minimum; such conceptions include, 
for example, human dignity, or the avoidance of serious harm. The needs implied by 
these conceptions typically include, in particular, basic levels of physical and mental 
health. 
 Galtung refines this picture in many ways. Not all needs correspond to rights, and 
not all rights correspond to needs. But a central set of human rights rest on basic needs. 
He warns that the traditional human rights approach connects better to survival needs and 
freedom needs, ‘needs that are more clearly threatened by deliberate acts of “evil” 
actors’, and for which we can more readily state norms in the form of rights that imply 
duties by specific actors. In contrast, various other needs ‘are more often impeded by 
“wrong” structures’ (Galtung 1994: 69). Here a post-traditional approach is required; 
‘needs rather than rights direct us to look for causal factors rather than evil actors’ (ibid.: 
55). 
 The concept of human rights forms in turn an essential partner to the discourse of 
basic needs. It provides an insistence on the value of each person, and a strong language 
of prioritization. These focus our attention and energies: ‘in adverse environments, the 
primary meaning of human rights is to make people aware of what is basically wrong’ 
(Goldewijk & Fortman 1999: 117). And when widely acknowledged as norms or legally 
recognized as instruments, rights form a major set of tools, legitimate claims, in the 
political struggles for fulfilment of needs. 
 Consider the example of the international debt of low-income countries. By the 
late 1990s many very poor countries paid more in debt service, largely to rich countries, 
than they spent on education or health. Typically their education and health budgets had 
been cut at the insistence of international financial organizations, after the countries had 
failed to service their debts following rises in oil prices and interest rates and other 
shocks. Sacrifice of the basic needs, the health and prospects, of millions of people in 
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order to service debts to, directly or indirectly, far richer groups became unsurprising and 
normal in the 1980s and 90s. ‘Jubilee 2000’ campaigners for debt relief achieved 
significant impact by showing how such cuts contravened the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) endorsed by nearly all governments, including the debt 
collectors. The UDHR prioritizes access to education and health care. In welfare-states, 
when a family goes bankrupt no child is expected to lose access to basic education and 
health care in order for debts to first be repaid; this principle should apply for people 
everywhere. 
 A connection between conceptions of needs and human rights has long been 
proposed, but also for long not adopted as a standard formulation. One still encounters 
social science dictionaries in which adjacent entries on human needs and human rights 
contain no reference to each other’s language. The two ideas have been primarily located 
in different disciplines and fora: rights more in the worlds of law and social movements, 
needs more within social and economic policy and planning. Added to this have been 
confusions around needs discourse, attacks on it by many libertarians and free-market 
advocates, and antagonism by some socialists and economists to rights formulations. In 
the past twenty years these obstacles have diminished and the fundamental connection of 
the two bodies of thought has become more evident, in work by for example Galtung, 
Gewirth and Waldron, without gainsaying the inevitable fuzziness in such concepts. 
 Rights are justified claims to the protection of persons’ important interests, argues 
Gewirth. Such ‘claim-rights’ have this structure: Person/subject A has a right to object X 
against duty-bearer B by virtue of ground Y. For ‘human rights’ the proposed ground is 
that the objects X are requisites for being human in a morally acceptable sense. 
According to Gewirth they are ‘the goods that are necessary for human action or for 
having general chances of success in achieving one’s purposes by action’. Henry Shue 
refers similarly to ‘basic rights’, those which are necessary to enjoy all other rights. In 
normative needs discourse, they are basic needs. 
 The concept of need arises in three importantly different modes. First, ‘needs’ in 
explanatory theory are powerful underlying motives or drives. Second, needs in 
normative theory are justified priorities based on a ‘relational formula’: Person A needs 
object X (or an equivalent ‘satisfier’) in order (reason Y) to do or attain goal G which is a 
high priority ín the relevant political community. Third, instrumental needs are the 
requisites (X) for G. Whether, in particular cases, object X brings fulfilment of a drive or 
motive is a matter for positive investigation. Whether object X really is required for 
achieving G is an instrumental issue for examination. Whether G is or should be a high 
priority is a matter for normative debate and political process.  
 Normative needs discourse thus has the same structure as claim-rights discourse. 
This can be obscured by failure to distinguish the three modes and also different levels in 
chains of instrumental and normative relations (Gasper 2004). Amartya Sen’s categories 
of capability and functioning help us to discuss levels more clearly. Martha Nussbaum’s 
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Women and Human Development (2000, Cambridge Univ. Press), proposes that many 
human rights are best seen as rights to basic needs seen in turn as basic capabilities to 
function. She argues that capabilities language has an advantage in not being felt as 
Eurocentric, but that rights language provides force and conveys respect for persons; and 
that using these languages together highlights respect for persons as choosers. 
 Sen holds further, in Development as Freedom (1999, Oxford Univ. Press), that 
political rights are important for not only the promotion and defence of need fulfilment, 
but for the processes of specifying needs. It is not true that needs discourse inherently 
presumes that persons are passive and materialistic and ignores them as active rights-
claiming choice-making agents. Autonomy of agency stands as central principle in the 
prominent normative needs theory of Len Doyal and Ian Gough (A Theory of Human 
Need, 1991, Macmillan). The table uses the structure of their theory to compare ethics of 
capabilities, basic needs, and human rights. As argued by Penz, the three are closely 
connected and complementary not competitive. 
 
 Basic Criterion  Requirements in 
order to fulfil the 
basic criterion  
(Needs level 1) 
Required satisfier 
characteristics  
(Needs level 2) 
Specific required 
satisfiers  
(Needs level 3) 
Required 
preconditions 
(Needs level 4) 
In the categories 
of the capability 
approach and 
UNDP’s ‘Human 
Development’ 
Priority 
functionings 
Capabilities that 
are required to 
achieve the 
priority 
functionings 
‘Characteristics’ 
of goods that are 
required to 
achieve those 
capabilities  
The goods / 
‘commodities’ 
that are required 
to provide those 
characteristics 
The societal 
conditions that 
are required to 
sustain the supply 
of those goods  
 
Doyal & Gough’s 
main formulation 
of human need 
 
 
Avoidance of 
serious harm  
 
Health; autonomy 
of agency 
Nourishment; 
housing; security 
in environment, 
work and 
childhood; health 
care, education, 
etc. 
 
Vary according to 
geographical, 
socio-economic 
and cultural 
setting 
Conditions 
concerning 
production, 
reproduction, 
cultural 
transmission, and 
political authority 
From Goldewijk 
& Fortman’s 
formulation of 
human rights 
Dignity / non-
humiliation,  
self-respect  
Equality and 
freedom; or, 
equality and 
agency 
Implications of 
Needs level 1 in 
this row 
 
Implications of 
Needs level 2 in 
this row; vary 
according to… 
 
 
 Galtung warns that institutionalization of human rights as a means towards 
fulfilling needs can become ineffective or counterproductive, due to the internal logics of 
the institutions involved. From recent South African experience, Hamilton holds that 
rights language bears too much the imprint of property rights, and ties fulfilment of 
priority human needs to the ability to expensively access a remote judicial system. That 
system takes existing property rights as the default case; claims against them must be 
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. Basic needs of the majority can in practice 
become downgraded by being stated in the same rights language as that of established 
propertyholding, he argues. But they can be downgraded by not using rights language 
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too. And a needs-rights conception can also influence and structure patterns of public 
provision, access and claiming in ways other than via the judicial system.  
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